Revisiting China’s Africa policies and educational promises: towards a global convergence of development in the post-2015 era? by Yuan, T
 
 
Yuan, T. (2019) 'Revisiting China’s Africa policies and 
educational promises: towards a global convergence of 
development in the post-2015 era?' Globalisation, Societies 
and Education. doi: 10.1080/14767724.2019.1595534. 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Group in Globalisation, 







This pre-published version is made available in accordance with publisher 
policies.  
Please cite only the published version using the reference above. 
 
Your access and use of this document is based on your acceptance of the 
ResearchSPAce Metadata and Data Policies, as well as applicable law:-
https://researchspace.bathspa.ac.uk/policies.html  
Unless you accept the terms of these Policies in full, you do not have 
permission to download this document. 
This cover sheet may not be removed from the document. 
Please scroll down to view the document. 
1 
 
Revisiting China’s Africa policies and educational promises: Towards 
a global convergence of development in the post-2015 era? 
Tingting Yuan 
Institute for Education, Bath Spa University, Bath, UK 






















Revisiting China’s Africa policies and educational promises: Towards 
a global convergence of development in the post-2015 era? 
Comparing China’s 2006 and 2015 Africa policies, this article reveals how 
China’s political discourse has become more confident, practical, and 
depoliticised. In particular, this paper shows how education is allocated, 
promised, and embedded in China’s ‘shared’ agenda, which is centred on 
development co-operation and mutual learning. It then reflects on the extent to 
which China may move towards traditional donors. This paper concludes that, 
despite fragmented convergences in the discourse and an increased recognition of 
a Chinese model, China maintains its distinctive role and position in the post-
2015 era. 






Propelled by the initiation of economic reforms in the late 1970s, creation of a socialist 
market economy in the 1990s, and a ‘new strategic win-win relationship’ with Africa 
since 2000, the rise of China has influenced the orthodox model of development 
regionally and internationally. In the realm of international development, China is 
assuming the status of a ‘reginal power’, ‘world power’, and an ‘emerging donor’. 
China has also challenged the discourse and practices of ‘traditional donors’, which are 
predominantly developed countries in Europe and North America and are mainly 
members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (Woods, 2008; He 2009; 
Welle-Strand 2010; Brautigam 2011a).  
        This paper reflects on China’s position in post-2015 international 
development from an international political economic (IPE) perspective which explores 
the tensions and interaction between ‘state’ and ‘market’ actors (Gilpin 1987; Strange 
1988) and focuses on economic globalisation and its structural effects. More 
specifically, the IPE perspective investigates how economic globalisation has shaped 
national policy and global governance, including World Bank/IMF-sponsored Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and the donor-recipient relationship they have created 
(Verger, Novelli, and Altinyelken 2018). From this perspective, there are three political 
economic reasons for this reflection. First, the traditional donor-recipient relationship 
centred around the achievements of a Rostovian ‘development’ and a process of 
developing countries ‘catching up’ to developed ones has not been fundamentally 
altered under the changing aid architectures. Second, neoliberal globalisation and its 
impact on international agendas and national policies does not appear to have lessened; 
on the contrary, it continues to occur through various forms, becoming more complex 
upon entering different types of society. Third, there is a limited acceptance of 
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‘alternative’ development models in the international agenda, such as the United 
Nation’s (UN) Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, which 
suggested South-South co-operation as a ‘complement, not a substitute, to North-South 
cooperation’ (United Nations 2015a, 28). Although strengthened a donor status in its 
second foreign aid white paper (Ministry of Commerce of People’s Republic of China 
2014), China still stands out of the DAC, the aid of which is officially indicated in and 
monitored by the global targets of development initiatives like the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
        Therefore, by looking at China’s African policies and its educational promise, this 
paper examines whether the rise of China is conforming to the dominant trends in 
international development today. In doing so, this paper argues that although China uses 
a more ‘convergent’ language in regard to its targets and promises in recent policies, it 
has a unique position and utilises a fundamentally different logic to define ‘aid’ and 
achieve development. Education, especially tertiary educational activities for human 
resource development, plays a key role in China’s ‘shared’ and ‘learning together’ 
development agenda.  
This study conducts a qualitative documentary analysis (Scott 1990) on chosen 
policy texts openly published on the official websites of the Chinese government, 
‘either to understand their substantive content or to illuminate deeper meanings which 
may be revealed by their style and coverage’ (Ritchie 2003, 35). The key documents 
examined are: (1) China’s Africa policies published in 2006 and 2015 and (2) action 
plans from Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) series. This study examines 
both the content and discursive features of the chosen texts. Bearing in mind that 
content analysis ‘varies with the theoretical and substantive interests of the researcher 
and the problem being studied’ (Weber 1990), this study looks at broader power 
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relations beyond the content, thereby transferring a critical approach to its documentary 
analysis. This approach is also based on the nature of the IPE perspective employed in 
this study, given its interest in global norms and the position of nation states in applying 
these norms. This theoretical perspective is associated with methods such as Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Blommaert  2005, 21). Therefore, at the content level, this 
study examines the changing policy structures, principles, co-operation areas, and 
educational targets in the chosen texts. At the discourse level, it borrows CDA 
technique which views language ‘as a form of social practice and focuses on the ways 
social and political domination is reproduced by text and talk’ (Fairclough 1995), 
paying particular attention to style, position, and historical context of the discourse.  
Policy 1 to 2: Moving from a declaration to an action plan 
In December 2015, the Chinese government released its second Africa Policy and its 
sixth three-year Action Plan on China-Africa Co-operation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the People’s Republic of China [FMPRC] 2015a). With the exception of some media 
discussion, there has been little systematic analysis of China’s transition from its 2006 
policy (FMPRC 2006) (hereinafter, Policy 1), which was released over a decade ago, to 
its 2015 policy (hereinafter, Policy 2). Where Policy 1 declared ‘what China plans to 
do’ at the beginning of twenty-first century, Policy 2 describes ‘what China has done 
and will do’ in the post-2015 era. Moreover, in comparison to Policy 1, Policy 2 is 
longer and more detailed. Table 1 provides a comparison of the two policies based on 
three dimensions: events (internal and external context), discourse, and content.  
[Table 1 near here] 
Table 1 shows that both policies were released at turning points in domestic and 
global politics. Policy 1 was released at a time when international aid was being 
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questioned and after the transition from the Washington to Post-Washington Consensus 
as a result of the major criticisms of World Bank/IMF’s reform (Robertson et al. 2007). 
The radical economic ‘recommendations’ based on the top-down Washington 
Consensus were gradually replaced by those of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP), which represented a more participatory and bottom-up model of development 
(Robertson et al. 2007). The UN’s eight MDGs provided potential space for ‘a new 
global partnership to reduce extreme poverty’ (United Nations, n.d.). Although not new 
to Africa, China was an ‘emerging donor’ that provided aid differently to ‘traditional 
donors’. As such, China’s active engagement with African countries and its declared 
desire for a ‘strategic win-win relationship’ with the continent aroused significant 
concern in the international community (Alden 2005, 2007; Owen and Melville 2005; 
King 2006; Zafar 2007). This became more remarkable after the 2006 Beijing Summit, 
when the Chinese government invited 48 African leaders to Beijing for the third 
FOCAC and officially adopted ‘win-win’ as its Africa strategy (FOCAC 2006a).  
Countries across the developing world, particularly in Africa, failed to reach the 
poverty reduction targets set by the MDGs (Lomazzi Borisch and Laaser 2014; UN, 
2015b). Meanwhile, China held FOCAC every three years since 2000, the forums 
becoming increasingly influential in international society (King 2006; Naidu 2007; 
Cooke 2009; Taylor 2006, 2010). Held in 2006, the third FOCAC ‘conformed to a 
major Chinese policy statement on Africa in the form of a white paper’—that is, Policy 
1. Suggesting ‘a wide menu of possible future Sino-African initiatives’, it was founded 
‘on an encouraging and optimistic forecast for Africa, thus providing a positive 
framework for Sino-African interaction’ (Shelton and Paruk 2008, 111). Two-year 
Action Plans have been released after every forum. These Action Plans have 
consistently promised different types of Chinese aid and co-operation in multiple 
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African regions. This includes, for instance, the rapidly growing number of government 
university scholarships granted to African students. While this has received significant 
interest, including positive feedback from African recipients (Dong and Chapman, 
2008; Nordtveit, 2011; Yuan 2013, 2014), it has also been subject to criticisms, for 
example, findings on how the positive perception can only represent Africa’s elitists 
(Sautman and Yan 2009). Following the release of the SDGs in 2015, the Chinese 
government announced its second Africa policy, through which it sought to establish 
‘multi­faceted exchanges and cooperation’ and a ‘comprehensive strategic and 
cooperative partnership’ with Africa. 
Further indications of China’s shifting development policies can be obtained at 
the textual level, although some text remains the same in both policies. In Policy 2, ‘co-
operative’ terms are repeatedly used and words such as ‘co-operation’, ‘mutual’, 
‘shared’, and ‘friendly/friendship’ are used frequently. One of the key features of the 
discourse is the use of the term ‘aid’: neither policy uses this term very often. Indeed, 
the term was used only twice in Policy 2 and once in Policy 1. In contrast, the word ‘co-
operation’ appeared 161 times in Policy 2 and 78 times in Policy 1. When inferring the 
meaning of ‘aid’, the policies use the term ‘assistance’ rather than ‘aid’. The term ‘aid’ 
is typically defined as ‘money, food, etc. that is sent to help countries in difficult 
situations (such as economic aid)’ (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary n.d., 32), 
while ‘assistance’ is defined more generally as ‘help or support’ (79). For instance, 
there are ‘aid agencies’ but no ‘assistance agencies’. It could be argued that China 
consciously chose to use ‘assistance’ to ensure that the relationship between the helper 
and the helped is loosely constructed. However, within an aid relationship, there is a 
clear and systematic donor-recipient hierarchy with targets, measurements, and 
techniques attached. In fact, aid and assistance are the same word in Chinese language: 
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‘Yuan Zhu’ (援助). The character ‘yuan’ (援) means ‘to pull with the hand’, ‘rescue’ or 
‘save’, ‘promote’, or ‘hold’, while ‘zhu’ (助) means to ‘help’ or ‘assist’. The character 
‘yuan’ (援) is contains the character for ‘hand’ (on the left), while ‘zhu’ (助) contains 
the character for ‘strength, effort’ (on its right). Thus, the translation of ‘yuanzhu’, 
which does not contain any connotation of the Western concept of ‘foreign aid’, seems 
closer to the English term ‘assistance’. This indicates China’s intent to distinguish its 
conception of the term ‘aid’ from that of the West: China’s African policy is not an 
‘aid’ policy. The relationship reflected in the text is one based on mutual benefit and co-
operation.  
In terms of the content, Policy 2 (approximately 8,700 words) is much longer 
than Policy 1 (approximately 3,300 words). The content regarding China-Africa co-
operation was increased from four areas in Policy 1 to seven in Policy 2 (Table 1). 
Moreover, ‘development co-operation’ and ‘people-to-people exchanges’ became new 
key terms. Policy 2 is much more detailed and elaborate, as Wekesa (2015) notes, ‘it 
begins to lose a strict policy feel as it draws on and incorporates elements of the 
FOCAC Declaration and Action Plan’. For instance, in the areas of education and 
human resource co-operation (Policy 2, Part III, 4.3), Policy 2 provides details on 
tertiary and vocational education co-operation, including the specific programmes like 
the ‘African talent programs’, ‘20+20 Co-operation plan for Chinese and African 
Institutions of Higher Education’, and ‘China-Africa Think Tanks 10+10 Partnership 
Plan’ (Policy 2, Part III, 4.3, 5.4). 
Both Policy 1 and 2 contain a section on the general principles and values of the 
China-Africa relationship (Part 3 of Policy 1 and Part 2 of Policy 2). Policy 1 contains a 
brief declaration of the general principles—such as ‘mutual benefit’ and ‘common 
development’—and places an emphasis on the ‘one China principle’. It is worth noting 
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that Policy 2 introduced a value system entitled ‘Yi Li Guan’ (义利观) (Policy 2, Part 
II) comprising a four-word principal: ‘sincerity’ (zhen, 真), ‘practical results’ (shi, 实), 
‘affinity’ (qin, 亲), and ‘good faith’ (cheng, 诚). Confucian philosophy explains ‘yi’ as 
justice, the moral principle of social activities and human relationships. ‘Li’ denotes the 
utilitarian side of human activities related to interests and benefits (Li 2015).  
Confucianism argues that the balance of moral principles and utilitarian pursuits 
is critical to society, although the value of justice should be prioritised over the seeking 
of benefits (Jia 2016). This is clearly reflected in Policy 2: ‘While valuing friendship 
and justice as well as shared interests, China places more importance on the former’. 
This is consistent with China’s preference for the term ‘assistance’ over ‘aid’, as the 
former may express a more humanitarian and moral meaning. Moreover, the official 
English version of Policy 2 translates ‘Yi Li Guan’ into ‘friendship, justice and shared 
interest’, not simply ‘justice’ and interest’. These principles are highlighted in Sino-
Africa relations, which are based on a fraternal relation and oriented towards common 
pursuits (Yuan 2011; King 2013; Niu 2013; Cheng and Taylor 2017). Further textual 
evidence includes the frequency of the terms ‘share/shared/sharing’ in Policy 2. ‘Shared 
interest’ seems closely connected with shared experience, shared development tasks, 
and a shared future. All mentions of the word ‘sharing’, which appear 11 times in Policy 
2, are related to ‘experience sharing’, ‘knowledge sharing’, or ‘intelligence sharing’. 
This sets a distinctive foundation for the role of education, which will be discussed later 
in this paper.  
Two principles are particularly noteworthy within this value system: the 
principle of ‘practical results’ (‘Shi’), which aims to achieve efficient results and 
focuses on ‘real actions and results’; and ‘affinity’ (‘Qin’), which emphasises 
‘harmony’, ‘mutual understanding’, and ‘people-to-people’ connections. While Policy 1 
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constitutes a typical declaration written in a diplomatic tone (government to 
government), Policy 2 is a more practical document that attempts to demonstrate how 
China will implement its diplomatic principles, especially in relation to the African 
public. This value foundation emphasises a sharing process based on mutual needs. As 
King (2013, 149) has discussed, in contrast to other traditional donors, such as Japan 
and Korea, China cannot provide a prescription for ‘successful experience’ because it 
has yet to be successful. However, China has described its ‘shared parallel challenges’ 
with Africa.  
Policy 2 lays out a results-based value system targeting specific exchanges and 
co-operation with Africa in various areas. Indeed, the value section of Policy 2 notes 
that, ‘it will strengthen coordination and cooperation with other countries as well as 
international and regional organizations based on the “Africa-proposed, Africa-agreed 
and Africa-led” principle and with an active, open and inclusive attitude’ (Policy 2, Part 
II). This reminds us of the term ‘donor logic’ (Steiner-Khamsi 2008; Yuan 2014). 
Steiner-Khamsi (2008) indicates how the logic of some lenders may seem ‘illogical’ to 
recipients. Similarly, Cammack (2007) has suggested that recipient governments should 
be driven by the needs and desires of their people, not donors. Interestingly, this 
description matches some key words in China’s policy, including: ‘two sides’, ‘mutual’, 
and ‘people’. This co-operation/exchange-oriented donor logic is deeply underscored in 
Policy 2.  
With less rhetoric, Policy 2 focuses more on the implementation of China’s 
promises. Policy 1 emphasises the ‘role’ and ‘position’ of China through terms such as 
‘rejuvenation’ and ‘emancipation’, which do not appear in Policy 2. In contrast, Policy 
2 reports China’s successes over the past decade and presents an action plan for its 
aspirations in accordance with the more detailed FOCAC pledges.  
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Two points emerge based on these features. First, Policy 2 has a more 
determined and confident discourse. On the one hand, the policy highlights the role of 
China in the current global political economy: ‘the world’s second largest economy’ 
and ‘an active player in the current international system that has helped build it and 
contributed to it’. This was not emphasised in Policy 1. On another hand, compared 
with Policy 1, which describes the close ‘relationship’ between China and Africa, 
Policy 2 provides a clearer argument regarding the need to sustain such a relationship 
and a plan for how to do so in the future. Meanwhile, Policy 2 underscores the common 
pursuit of development to realise both the ‘Chinese dream’ and ‘African dream’, thus 
creating a ‘shared future’ (the Chinese version describes this more vividly as a 
‘community of common destiny’). Therefore, this confidence is not just about China’s 
strategy in Africa, but the extent to which China-Africa co-operation will contribute to 
the development of both. 
 Second, China plays the role of the ‘actor’ rather than ‘declarer’ in Policy 2. The 
policy provides more details on co-operation plans, particularly ‘economic and trade co-
operation’, ‘development co-operation’, and ‘cultural and people-to-people co-
operation’. In contrast, Policy 1 did not have a section on ‘development co-operation’. 
Moreover, Policy 2 made far more promises regarding ‘development’. These promises 
are more technical, practical, and achievable than those only briefly outlined in Policy 
1. China’s aid program has been criticised for a lack of transparency, technical 
framework, and professional agencies (Grimm et al. 2011; Yuan 2011; cited by King, 
2013, 151; Carter 2017). Arguably, Policy 2 represents a more ‘professional’ attempt to 
create an effective policy, one with reduced political and ideological rhetoric. Although 
it has yet to follow the example of Western donors in terms of aid delivery and 
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evaluation, China has switched to a more action-based approach to demonstrate its 
strengthened commitment to international development since Policy 1.  
 
Education: A key player in ‘development co-operation’ 
Arguably, Policy 2 is a new ‘version’ of Policy 1. Indeed, the Chinese government did 
not make any fundamental changes to its principles, especially in terms of the two-way 
assistance relationship. Rather, it  adjusted its policy style by improving the 
practicalities, while making it more detailed and strategic. While traditional donors 
focus on monitoring practices, these policy developments reflect China’s emphasis on 
two-way knowledge and experience exchange within its practices, which are based on 
shared history, as well as a ‘shared progress’ and ‘shared future’ between parties. This 
has been reinforced in both Policy 1 and 2. Indeed, Policy 1 outlines the following 
priorities: 
[…] learning from each other and seeking common development. China and Africa 
will learn from and draw upon each other’s experience in governance and 
development, strengthen exchange and cooperation in education, science, culture 
and health. Supporting African countries’ efforts to enhance capacity building, 
China will work together with Africa in the exploration of the road of sustainable 
development. (Policy 1, Part III)   
This principle is also embedded in China’s political non-interference position as 
outlined in Policy 2, which stresses that China is sharing in the development process 
rather than intervening in or prescribing it: 
[China] stands ready to exchange governance experience with African countries on 
the basis of equality and voluntarism, and promote mutual understanding and 
acceptance of and learning from each other’s political system and development 
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path. China has always sincerely supported Africa’s development. (Policy 2, Part 
II) 
The statement above was included under ‘Sincerity’, which underscores mutual 
trust and support and is part of Policy 2’s Yi Li Guan value system (Table 1). As such, 
this two-way experience sharing process is strengthened in a more formal way and 
linked to other three principles, such as ‘practical results’. Education is becoming more 
meaningful in this context of ‘mutual learning’ (Niu and Liu 2016, 281). This is unique 
in two respects. First, this differs from allocating ‘education’ under Education for All 
(EFA) or SDGs in the current ‘deterritorialisation of the education policy process’ 
(Verger 2014, 14). Second, this differs from a focus on formal or primary education 
(e.g. Universal Primary Education); rather, it includes a broad range of educational 
activities and education at different levels.  
Although such studies remain limited, researchers have examined the history, 
approaches, modalities, philosophy, and mechanisms of China’s educational aid/co-
operation, revealing similar findings concerning its distinctive characteristics (Li 2006; 
Li 2007; Hui 2007; He 2007; King 2007, 2010; Nordveit 2010; Niu 2009, 2013; Yuan 
2011, 2014, 2015; Niu and Liu 2016). Analysing the discourse on ‘education’ in 
China’s Africa policy, this section verifies some extant notions regarding how Chinese 
educational promises cannot be examined in the same way as the education targets of 
international agendas.   
In Policy 2, ‘Education’ and educational actions are detailed in a section entitled 
‘Development co-operation’, and embedded in promises regarding human resource 
development (HRD), poverty alleviation experience sharing, science and technology co-
operation, and so on (Policy 2, Part III, 4). Development co-operation is not listed in the 
four areas of co-operation in Policy 1 (Table 1). However in Policy 2, it constitutes a 
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separate section parallel to co-operation in political, economics/trade, and cultural areas, 
which may indicate a depoliticised conceptualisation of ‘development’. This seems 
slightly different from China’s image in pursuing educational initiatives for friendship 
and win-win relations (Nordveit 2010). Based on its non-conditional declaration, it has 
even less of a cultural and political mission. (However, arguably, it is difficult to treat 
these factors separately in terms of their actual effects and mechanisms). As stated at the 
beginning of the ‘Development co-operation’ section:  
China’s assistance will be primarily used in the areas of human resources 
development, infrastructure, medical care and health […] with the aim to help 
African countries alleviate poverty, improve people’s livelihoods and build up 
capacity for independent development. (Policy 2, Part III, 4.1) 
Knowledge, skills, and experience sharing are highlighted in this section. 
Defined as a key factor in HRD, education inevitably plays a key role here. This greatly 
exceeds formal education. Despite being specifically stated in the sub-section on 
‘cooperation in education and HRD’, educational activities like experience exchange 
activities conducted by ‘academic institutions’ and ‘joint research centres’ in science 
and technology also appear in the other sub-sections. 
It is worth noting that the Chinese government did not place ‘education’ under 
‘Cultural and people-to-people exchanges’ in Policy 2. Further details regarding the 
changing ‘locations’ of education in FOCAC action plans are observed in Table 2. 
[Table 2 near here] 
The 2006 FOCAC plan emphasised education as a contributor to ‘social 
development’, reflecting a development view based on economic growth and ‘people’, 
while focusing on the need to ‘put people first’ in development processes (World Bank 
2018). The 2012 plan also frequently mentions education, particularly ‘Human resource 
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development’ and ‘Science and technology co-operation and knowledge sharing’, both 
of which are subsections of ‘Co-operation in the field of development’ (similarly 
located in Policy 2). The promises outlined in both subsections were to be achieved 
through various actions in higher education, such as co-operation and agreements 
between research centres. Both the 2015 and most recent 2018 Action Plans include 
education in ‘Social development co-operation’ (FMPRC 2015, 2018).  
This may be interpreted as follows. First, education does not only contribute to 
economic development, but also seems to be the key justification of development 
because of its contributions to ‘people’. According to the 2015 FOCAC declaration, the 
exchange of education is aimed at ‘deepening the understanding and friendship between 
the peoples of China and Africa’ (FOCAC 2015b, Item 25.3). Second, to further 
distinguish between ‘educational co-operation’ and pure cultural activities that may 
focus on expressing political and ideological values, current policies (from 2015) have 
re-allocated ‘education’ to ‘social development co-operation’ once again. This may 
indicate that education has a more neutral position within China’s current development 
policy, highlighting the connections between education, people, society, and 
development in a more internationally acceptable way.  
However, China does not only follow the ‘social development’ defined by 
international institutions, which promotes social inclusion by improving participatory 
levels in society (UNESCO 2018). Indeed, there is little in China’s promises to evidence 
an address of social inequalities, inclusion, or how education can contribute to these 
issues. While the 2015 plan mentions ‘persons with disabilities’ and ‘gender equality’ in 
its people-to-people promise (FOCAC Action Plan, 2015, Items 5.4.6 and 5.4.8), the 
discourse generally places greater emphasis on ‘independent and sustainable 
development’ (i.e. how people can use their own methods and capacities to develop 
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their countries) rather than ‘social inclusion’ (i.e. including all people in development). 
This is also evident in China’s growing focus on human resource training in education 
co-operation (Li and April 2013).  
In terms of the educational co-operation approaches stated in the policies, there 
is a growing emphasis on tertiary education and vocational training. This includes an 
increasing number of Chinese government scholarships and the provision of training in 
the form of seminars and workshops, with 50,000 scholarships and 50,000 training 
opportunities promised in the 2018 Beijing Action Plan (2019–2021) (FMPRC 2018). 
This also involves enhanced university co-operation through ‘20+20 Co-operation Plan 
for Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education’, which links ‘twenty 
universities or colleges in Africa with counterparts in China’, including top ranked 
Chinese and African universities (King 2014; Yuan 2015).   
China is not the first country to strengthen the role of higher education in public 
diplomacy as a means of boosting its soft power. Indeed, the US did this a long time 
ago. A practice reflected by the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who asserted, ‘I 
can think of no more valuable asset to our country than the friendship of future world 
leaders who have been educated here’ (Nye 2005, 13). However, the knowledge 
transformation coming from China contains a markedly Chinese ‘experience’, which 
seems to be the most attractive part of its educational partnership (Brautigam 2011b). 
Unlike prescriptive recommendations such as the Washington Consensus (Williamson 
2004) and the successful experiences of developed countries, Chinese experience 
contains both successful and failed lessons. In the background paper for EFA Global 
Monitoring Report 2015 Reilly (2015: 6) quoted a Chinese expert that, ‘China is not 
really promoting its own approach, but naturally Chinese experts and officials prioritise 
programs and issues which they think will be useful for developing countries.’  
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The Chinese way of ‘boosting productivity and the associated emphasis on rapid 
and large investments in human and physical capital’, as Diop (2015) has argued, is 
attractive to both Africa itself and international institutions such as the World Bank, 
which has been systematically working on African development for decades. African 
leaders are keen to learn from China on how to organise the trade policy, to ‘move from 
low to middle income status’, to educate their children in ‘skills and areas that pay off in 
just a couple years’ and compare these to Western economic practices (Sautman and 
Yan 2007, 80). According to Obiorah (2007, 38),  
For many among Africa’s ruled who are physically and intellectually exhausted by 
two decades of economic ‘reform’ supposedly adopted by African governments but 
driven by Western governments, donors and the IFIs [International Financial 
Institutions], China represents hope that another world is possible in which bread 
comes before the freedom to vote.  
Similarly, Makundi et al. (2017) revealed that the trainees in their sample were 
largely positive about their Chinese training experiences in terms of performance and 
overall quality, and that a large proportion of participants ‘favoured the Chinese training 
over the Western options’. Interestingly, some of the key words used by participants in 
regard to their Chinese training—such as ‘relevant’, ‘practical’, and ‘modern’—match 
China’s values and principles as stated in Policy 2.  
As another step forward in China’s focus on higher education, Policy 2 and the 
latest FOCAC have pledged the country’s desire to be more professional in its provision 
of educational development. This is consistent with the general tone of Policy 2. The 
first indication of this ‘professionalism’ was China’s promise to improve both the 
quantity (which has been achieved according to China’s 2014 Foreign Aid white paper) 
and quality of education, especially concerning training programmes. Further evidence 
is evident in both the 2009 Action Plan, which ‘pay[s] special attention to raising the 
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quality of such training’, and 2012 Action Plan, which ‘take[s] measures to improve the 
content and quality of the training programs’.  
The second indication is the involvement of an increasing number of renowned 
universities, as noted earlier. Yuan (2013) has demonstrated that some African students 
who studied in China on Chinese government scholarships in the twenty-first century 
experienced several problems, including assessment, the language barrier, and cultural 
integration. Recent policies and action plans appear to respond to these ‘quality’ issues. 
Moreover, academic co-operation and development studies among higher education 
institutions and think tanks have been greatly enhanced under recent policy framework 
(FOCAC 2012, 2015). Meanwhile, the promise of improved quality remains rather 
vague in comparison to the clear improvements in quantity. Educational co-operation is 
still regarded as pragmatism rather than professionalism (Niu and Liu 2016). Similarly, 
Luedi’s recent article (2018) reveals issues such as the managing of English-speaking 
classes and lax standard of African students, noting that ‘utility trumps quality’. As 
such, solid evidence and the perceptions of current African students in China are 
required to verify whether the promise of improve quality has been achieved.  
Moreover, China has its own allocation regarding basic education and higher 
education, and this is related to how the official documents define ‘aid’ and ‘co-
operation’. The Chinese government appears to classify basic education assistance—
such as school donations and construction—as ‘aid’, while university scholarships and 
vocational training constitute ‘co-operation’. China’s 2014 Foreign Aid white paper 
clearly demonstrates that the country’s educational aid includes the ‘construction and 
maintenance of primary and secondary schools’. However, while still mentioned and 
promised in earlier action plans, recent FOCAC plans (2012, 2015, 2018) do not 
highlight China’s contributions at the basic education level. Indeed, the word ‘school’ 
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does not even appear in the 2006 or 2015 Africa Policies. It seems that ‘donation’ is 
excluded from a co-operation-oriented policy. This shows that China is clarifying its 
relationship with Africa (noting that the 2014 white paper is about aid rather than ‘Sino-
Africa’ relations) and where to focus on education in its co-operation with Africa. 
Arguably, it is not the allocation of education in social development discourse 
that is distinctive, but the rationale of embedding education and training as an essential 
aspect of two-way but independent development. Moreover, it is not China’s approach 
of providing ‘education’ that is distinctive, but the ‘experience’ shared through 
educational activities. Not simply an area of co-operation in China’s Africa policy, 
education is embedded in many places in China’s experience sharing agenda. According 
to Xu (2007, 1), these education promises are ‘practical, interactive, independent, 
systematic and integrated’. Current policies are clearly focused on tertiary education 
and training: while there is little indication of how to co-operate towards the goal of 
EFA, there is about how many professionals will be trained in the future. This is in line 
with Policy 2’s vision of learning together and experience sharing. However, in an 
effort to improve its professionalism, China’s promises have concentrated on the 
practical details, including: the allocation of ‘education’ under ‘development’ rather 
than economic/cultural/political co-operation plans, and linking education to terms such 
as ‘poverty reduction’ and ‘capacity building’, which rarely appeared in Policy 1. This 
may be regarded as converging towards the traditional donor group, which has a clearer 
‘technocratic framework’ of aid (Kothari 2005, 443). The next section summarises some 
key points of such a ‘convergence’. 
China’s position: Towards a global convergence?  
This section examines to what extent China’s current position may move towards a 
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global convergence. It is far more difficult to examine and compare the actual practice 
without empirical evidence and large-scale evaluation; however, it is possible to 
examine whether there is a convergent tendency between China and traditional donors 
from the analysis of China’s policies above.  
Political science defines the concept of convergence as ‘the tendency of societies 
to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and performances’ 
(Kerr 1983, 3). Convergence is also related to influence, competition, and intervention. 
In terms of the global political economy, convergence is not always a two-way process 
of ‘becoming alike’, usually by moving towards one another. Rather, it is typically a 
one-way process of ‘catching up’ with ‘norms’ and ‘best practice’. This is increasingly 
related to the assumption that reginal and global convergence will occur as a result of 
the force of single market logic, which has influenced ‘a number of policy areas and 
political processes’ (Bennett 1991). In education studies, convergence is frequently 
mentioned in discussions of policy borrowing and transfer. The IPE perspective 
examines such convergence among societies as various types of influence rather than 
simple borrowing and learning. Such studies regard it is a process of transmitting 
‘particular views of education and educational reform, basically instrumental and 
market oriented, to national contexts’ (Verger, Novelli, and Altinyelken 2018, 14). 
However, within this transmission, the key players—such as the international 
organisations—‘express divergent and even rivalling education agendas’ like the 
knowledge economy and EFA (Verger, Novelli, and Altinyelken 2018). Therefore, 
while this paper views traditional donors as one group due to their shared view of 
Western modernisation as both a ‘theory and prescription’ of development (Dale 1982; 
Robertson et al. 2007), there are still divergences among these donors. 
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Moreover, this paper does not to advance any global convergence or that 
globalisation can produce convergence. On the contrary, it agrees that ‘globalisation is 
not a homogeneous process’ (Dale 1999). It is also critical of the standardisation and 
hierarchies within certain policy convergences. This paper accepts the 
transformationalists’ view of ‘uncertainties’, which allow us think about the possibilities 
of the new roles, models, and relationships produced by globalisation and their effects 
on the current ‘norms’ (Held et al. 1999). As Giddens has noted, the outcome of 
globalisation is ‘not necessarily, or even usually, a generalised set of changes acting in a 
uniform direction, but consists in mutually opposed tendencies’ (cited by Held et al. 
1999, 44; Berry et al. 2014, 388).  
This raises the question of whether there any possibility or evidence indicating 
that China, as an ‘emerging donor’, and traditional donors are ‘becoming alike’.  In 
considering the possibilities of ‘becoming alike’, Nordtveit’s (2009) study has 
concluded that China and the Western growth-based development and education 
paradigm are getting similar since China’s economic opening up from 1980s. 
Peerenboom (2014, 651) questions whether there is a global convergence on a new 
development model for developing countries—that is, a ‘post-Washington, Post-Beijing 
Consensus’. He argues that the China model of economic growth may need to be 
adjusted due to its focus on state-led investment, while the Western model is moving in 
a less radical economic direction in the post-Washington Consensus era. Peerenboom 
(2014, 670) concludes that: ‘there is growing support for a middle way, between the 
invisible hand of the neoliberal WC and the too heavy hand of the government in China 
and other East Asian developmental state’.  Although the picture is remains very vague, 
Peerenboom does consider some ‘middle way’ requiring two or more powers moving 
towards each other.  
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Similarly, King (2013, 165) has questioned the ‘distinctiveness, but the 
beginning of convergence’. Highlighting China’s distinctive status in common 
development, King (2013) discusses China’s co-operative agenda in Africa with 
developed countries such as the UK and Japan; tripartite collaboration, such as the 
UNESCO-China-Africa university leaders meeting; as well as China’s opening-up to 
other agencies. Nonetheless, he concludes, ‘in terms of whether China’s approach 
towards aid has begun to converge more with those of traditional DAC donors, there is 
little in what we have reviewed […] that would indicate a significant change’ (King 
2003, 171).  
Examining the changes between Policy 1 and Policy 2 and the educational 
discourse of FOCAC promises reveals some ‘fragmented’ signs of a so-called 
convergence, including the changing tone (de-politicisation) of China’s Africa policies 
and its action-based policy discourse. These signs indicate that China may be moving 
towards a more ‘Western’ manner of policy delivery and practice planning. More 
specifically, there is a growing discourse of ‘development’ in Chinese policy, including: 
adding a section on ‘development co-operation’, looking at ‘all-round development’, 
placing education in the ‘social development’ category, as well as encouraging 
knowledge exchange on development at various levels and via different approaches. 
Development is not only a process or target but a key word and a central agenda in 
China’s current policies. As an essential part of a ‘learning together’ development 
policy centred on economic growth, education has been relocated and reprioritised: on 
par with culture and health in Policy 1, education is an indispensable part of 
‘development co-operation’ in Policy 2. This allocation has also been emphasised in the 
recent FOCAC plans.  
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Moreover, the aim of China’s development policy has become ‘poverty 
reduction’. This was mentioned for the first time in Policy 2, where it appeared 15 
times. Policy 2 also highlights that China’s contribution to poverty reduction is ‘sharing 
and popularizing the [Chinese] experience in poverty alleviation’, as well as supporting 
‘African countries in enhancing their capability of independent poverty alleviation and 
development’ (Policy 2, 4.4). It is worth noting that, although having added features of 
post-Washington Consensus agenda to its new policy, China uses the word 
‘independent’ in front of ‘poverty alleviation’ and ‘development’ in most cases.  
I argue that the aforementioned features represent China’s harmonised position 
in international development rather than a clear convergence. These features did not 
change the nature of China’s distinctiveness, which is partly rooted in its unique history. 
China as a developing country that is still a recipient, has never colonised other 
countries and was never colonised; and has never been attached to Western theories of 
modernity, instead findings its own route to modernisation following the founding of 
the People’s Republic of China. Although not defined as colonisation, the foreign 
intervention and imperialism by both western powers and Japan have deeply influenced 
the discourse on ‘independent’ development in China’s foreign policy. These historical 
experiences have ‘created [China’s] determination to achieve parity with foreign powers 
(Moutford 2017). Principles such ‘mutual benefit’ and ‘help recipient countries develop 
independence and self-reliance’ were formally announced as early as in 1964, during 
Premier Zhou’s tour in Ghana and Mali (Chin and Frolic 2007, 4). The contemporary 
experience as a recipient country ‘influenced their thinking about how countries can use 
aid and development finance for mutual benefit’ (Brautigam 2011b, 16) and also helped 
China learn the importance of HRD from Japan’s ODA (Niu and Liu 2016).  
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While China may show some similarity to the patterns or approaches of the 
West in terms of its aid discourse and practice, it does not show a similar position in 
terms of influencing or persuading others in the process of national and global 
development. Dale (1999) identifies different types of ‘external effects’ on national 
policies including imposition, harmonisation, dissemination, and standardisation. From 
the policy texts, it is difficult to see China exerting any of these influences because it 
does not engage in educational policy implementation in African countries (e.g. nothing 
similar to PISA or Bologna Process). In other words, China currently sees development 
in a more systematic and strategic way, but may not develop a model—Chinese or 
Western—as a prescription for international development (Liu 2008). This is clearly 
evident in the aforementioned value system, which is a combination of China’s 
contemporary and traditional philosophies. This ‘non-modelling’ stance is clearer in 
China’s position paper on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (FMPRC 2015b). While 
this position paper did not deny any principle of the MDGs or SDGs and highlighted 
China as ‘the first developing country to achieve the poverty eradication goal ahead of 
the MDGs deadline’, it declared the need for ‘diversity’ and ‘justice’ in international 
development and called for a ‘fair, inclusive, and sustainable set of shared development 
aspirations’. As this paper notes,  
[China respects] diversity in development models. It is important to recognize the 
different national realities and the level of development among countries and 
support their choice of development strategies, models, and paths most suited to 
their respective conditions [and] adhere to the principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities”. Countries need to make development their common 
objective, and — based on their capabilities—achieve their own development and 
participate in global development cooperation in their own ways. (FMPRC 2015b) 
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China’s educational promises and practices have been consistent with the 
aforementioned position. Although seeking to achieve poverty reduction, China has its 
own focus on tertiary and vocational training, as well as key areas of knowledge, skills, 
and personnel for development rather than promising Education for All or Universal 
Primary Education to African countries (Niu and Liu 2016).   
It may be also necessary to consider the other direction—that is, whether the 
West is moving towards China. Despite studies that demonstrate interests on what 
lessons the West can learn from China’s engagement in Africa (Brautigam 2011b), there 
is little policy evidence showing the traditional donors are addressing or borrowing any 
Chinese approach or model in their international agendas.  However, Brautigam (2011b: 
16) did make a strong conclusion and even a warning on the need of a ‘better 
understanding’ of China and countries like China in Africa, and a re-consideration on 
their policy about China:   
[O]nce we have that understanding, we may be better positioned to accept the 
recommendations of thoughtful African officials like Ngozi Okonjo‐Iweala 
[(2006)]:  “China should be left alone to forge its unique partnership with African 
countries and the West must simply learn to compete.” 
King (2013: 171) has noted evidence of ‘traditional partners moving towards 
China’, quoting some ideas from a symposium report by the Oxford University China-
Africa Network in 2012, recognising that ‘China’s approach to economic growth and 
development assistance is currently impacting development thinking and practice of 
traditional Western donors’. As King published before the release of SDGs and China’s 
second Africa Policy (2015), signs from the SDGs may be explored to extend King’s 
argument. MDGs have had a strong ‘donor’ tone regarding aid and aid monitoring. Goal 
8 (United Nations 2000) on ‘global partnership for development’ mainly focused on 
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ODA countries’ responsibilities rather than on defining and constructing a partnership 
between the global North and South. Based on MDGs, SDGs have developed certain 
considerations regarding global partnerships. As King (2017) notes regarding SDGs:  
[T]he word ‘international’ appears no less than 20 times in the text of the 19 goals 
[…] The spirit of internationalism runs throughout the SDG agreement, even if the 
whole process is based on an assumption of national implementation.  
More specifically, in Target 4 of the goal to ‘Ensure inclusive and equitable 
quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all’, 4B and 4C 
targeted scholarships and teacher training for developing countries, making particular 
mention of ‘international co-operation’ in teacher training in developing countries. It 
also aimed to ‘substantially expand globally the number of scholarships available to 
developing countries’ (United Nations 2018). However, the indicator for 4B, stated in 
4B.1 as ‘volume of official development assistance [ODA] flows for scholarships by 
sector and type of study’, still looks at the traditional donors’ contribution only (United 
Nations 2018). However, China’s engagement and its dedication to increasing the 
number of training programmes and university scholarships have actually responded 
well to this target. As such, SDGs may show an increasing encouragement on a two-
way collaboration rather than one-way prescription. However, while ‘co-operation’ is 
easy in theory, the actual calculation for the evaluation, balance of power, distribution 
of resources, and the division of responsibilities may be the real challenges given the 
difficulty of altering the existing donor-recipient hierarchy.   
Conclusion  
This paper concludes by highlighting two main points. First, China is trying to 
consolidate its position and be more active through an updated version of policy 
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discourse that represents both the (a) current international agenda on development and 
poverty reduction; and (b) its own understanding on the foundation of international 
development—that is, the ‘shared’ past, present ,and future. This brings a wide range of 
educational activities to an essential place in order to achieve development through 
‘learning from one another’. While there are some indications that the SDGs are 
encouraging international co-operation, details of co-operation remain vague. It is 
difficult to find clear evidence in the policy discourse to show that both the North and 
South (e.g. DAC donors and China) are moving towards each other in terms of their 
actions. Second, China has a special position on education. However, while devoting 
increasing effort to educational aid and co-operation, it is not shaping education policies 
globally. Instead, China’s focus is on self-enhancement and exchanging its ‘indigenous 
solution’ to economic development via education (Li 2008, 34).  
Neither the Washington Consensus, which promotes a globalised neoliberalism, 
nor the Beijing consensus (Ramo 2004), which is based on a pragmatic and flexible 
‘Chinese socialist economy’, are globally accepted today. If convergence is defined as 
agreement on one specific model of development, then there remains no convergence in 
this matter. However, it can be concluded that, using a convergent approach and 
technique, China brings its experience and logic of development to the current 
international agenda at a time when the country’s distinctiveness is becoming 
increasingly recognised. Therefore, if there is an aspect of mutual influence in terms of 
convergence (i.e. not moving towards a middle point, but influencing one another in a 
more in-depth way), China may produce new insights regarding what convergence 
means in and to context of international development context and how to pursue it. 
As Robertson (2018) concludes, global transformation is not creating effects like 
a ‘steamroller’. On the contrary, ‘it is the complex reworking, re/bordering and 
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re/ordering of education spaces to include a range of scales of action’ (Robertson 2018, 
52). Traditional aid and the power imbalance that it creates between donor and recipient 
countries has been rooted in the developing world since the end of the Second World 
War to the Post-Washington Consensus. As such, it will not be easy to accommodate 
China’s influence, especially when China is only sharing experience while still 
exploring solutions to development. It is important to be recognise that every nation 
state can historicise and position itself in a unique way whilst connecting itself to others 
based on such diversity. Therefore, a convergent model may not be as essential as a 
convergent attitude towards incorporating diverse voices and solutions in the realm of 
international development.  
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Table 1: A Comparison of China’s 2006 and 2015 African Policies 
 China’s 2006 Africa Policy  China’s 2015 Africa Policy 
Events 3
rd
 FOCAC (Beijing Summit) 
Global: from WC to post-WC, PRSPs, MDGs 
6
th
 FOCAC (Johannesburg summit) 
Global: from MDGs to SDGs, ‘new circumstances’  
Discourse Text  Frequently using ‘co-operation’, ‘mutual’, ‘shared’, ‘friendly’/’friendship’ 
 Using term ‘assistance’ rather than ‘aid’ 
3300+ words 
‘peace/peaceful’ (‘Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence’), ‘present to the world…’, ‘role’, ‘position’ 
8700+ words 
‘further clarify...and expound the new vision…’, 
‘multi-faceted exchanges and co-operation’, 
‘comprehensive’, ‘capacity building’ 
Style Declaration (more rhetoric) Report, action plan 
38 
 
Content Principles  Sincerity 
 Friendship and equality mutual benefit 
 Reciprocity and common prosperity  
 Mutual support and close coordination  
 Learning from one another and seeking common 
development 
 Value of ‘friendship, justice and shared interest’  
 Principles of sincerity 
 Practical results, affinity, and good faith (zhen, shi, 
qin, cheng: 真，实，亲，诚) 
Co-operation 
areas 
Four areas:  
(1) Political field  
(2) Economic field  
(3) Education/science/culture/health/social aspects 
(4) Peace and security 
Seven areas:  
(1) Political (mutual trust) 
(2) International affairs 
(3) Economics and trade 
(4) Development co-operation (including education) 
(5) Cultural and people-to-people exchanges  
(6) Peace and security 
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(7) Consular services, immigration, judicial, and police 
areas.  






Table 2. Allocations of ‘Education’ in China’s FOCAC action plans 
FOCAC Action 
Plans 
Allocation of ‘Education’ Emphasis of role 
2006 Co-operation in social development Development and people 
2009 Co-operation in the field of 
development 
Economic development 
2012 Culture and people-to-people 
exchange and co-operation 
Culture and people 
2015 
2018 
Social development co-operation 
Social development co-operation 
Development and people 
Development and people 
(FOCAC 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015a, 2018) 
 
 
